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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
LaVELL A. DesBOUILLONS and 1 
HENRIETTA R. DesBOUILLONS, 
Plaintiffs- I 
Respondents, 
vs. 
KENNETH 0. HOLT and 
VERDELL T. HOLT, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
I 
I 
I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 15297 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Complaint was originally filed by the Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, seeking the recovery of delinquent rent due and 
owing by the Defendants and Appellants on a Covenant of Lease 
for rental of premises set forth as a First Count and on a 
Second Count for delinquent rental due and owing on a Rental 
Contract of certain signs. The Respondents filed an amendment 
to Repondents' Complaint seeking recovery for damages resulting 
from the breach of a Lease Agreement for real property and for 
the breach of a Sign Rental Agreement, to which the Appellants 
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and Defendants filed an Answer, wherein the Defendants allege 
as a defense scrivener's error in the description of the premises 
set forth in the Land Lease Agreement and Defendants and Appellants, 
filed a Counterclaim, complaining of breach of contract as 
against the Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, in a trial without a jury, entered 
a Judgment of no cause of action on Defendants' Counterclaim 
for breach of contract and damages, and entered Judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiffs and Respondents for rentals as provided 
for in the Covenant of Lease of real property, together with 
a cost of living index increase for rental and interest, as 
provided for in the Covenant of Lease, together with the delin-
quent sign rentals, and for an amount due and owing under the 
terms of the Covenant of Lease and Rental Agreement as and 
for taxes, insurance, and window breakage for a period from 
July, 1975, to September 10, 1976, together with attorney's 
fees as provided for in the covenants entered into by the DefendM~ 
and Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek an Order of this Honorable Court 
upholding the Judgment of the Lower Court confirming the Judgment 
entered therein. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A Covenant of Lease for premises situated on the corner 
of 20th Street and Washington Boulevard, in Ogden, Utah (R-
95), was entered into on October 6, 1973, (Pl.Ex.l), together 
with an additional piece of property situated to the west of 
the demised property and contiguous to said property which was 
set forth in the Lease Agreement by metes and bounds. (Pl.Ex.l) 
The Sign Rental Agreement was entered wherein the Respondents 
were the Lessors and the Appellants were the Lessees on November 12, 
197 3, (R-2 4) (Pl. Ex. 3) , said sign being upon the leased property 
(R-24). 
The demised premises and the leased sign were previously 
operated by the Respondents under the trade name of Auto Care 
Center. 
The Appellants were in possession of the demised premises 
from October 6, 1973, and of the rented sign from November 12, 
1973 (R-24), and continued in possession and operation of the 
premises and peaceably occupied the premises, doing business 
and without interference of the possession of the premises by 
any one (R-58), and did not allege a wrongful description of 
one of the parcels of property set forth in the Covenant of 
Lease until notified by Attorney for the Appellants on September 11, 
1975 (R-24). 
-3-
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The Appellants further paid rent for the demised premises 
from date of Lease of 1973, becoming delinquent in payment of 
the monthly rents and failing to pay thereafter commencing with 
July 15, 1975, (Pl.Ex.l3), and did also pay rent for the Sign 
Contract from date of entry into said Sign Contract in 1973 
and became delinquent in payment of the Sign Contract commencing 
with the month of July 1, 1975. 
The Appellants abandoned the premises on November 7, 
1975, (Pl.Ex.25), and advised the Attorney for the Respondents 
on January 27, 1976, of the vacating of the premises and returned 
the keys to the premises in a communication of January 27, 1976, 
(Pl.Ex.25). 
The Respondents, upon notice of the abandonment of the 
premises by the Appellants and upon receipt of the return of 
the keys to the premises from the Appellants, attempted to make 
a sale of the property (R-119), and upon the sale not being 
consummated, entered into a Listing Agreement for the sale and/or 
rental of the property with the Wardley Corporation, a real 
estate broker, (Pl.Ex.B), and subsequently upon the failure 
of the broker to make a sale or lease of the premises, engaged 
the services of Junius Tribe, a realtor, (R-121), which resulted 
in the sale of the property to Robert H. Hinkley, Inc., September 1 
1976. (Pl.Ex.l5) 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SCRIVENOR' S ERROR DOES NOT NULLIFY LEASE \i,IHERE NO 
INTERFERENCE WITH PEACEABLE POSSESSION. 
A Covenant of Lease as between the Appellants and the 
Respondents contained the description of two parcels of property, 
wherein the description describing the premises contained a 
wrong description as to that part of the premises upon which 
the building and sign was situated and a correct description 
as to the parking area and property immediately west and contiguous 
to the building and premises. (Pl.Ex.l) 
The Appellants occupied the premises and did business 
for a period of approximately two years from 1973 to 1975, 
(R-58), had peaceable possession thereof until the Appellants 
abandoned the premises and vacated same by a notice of January 27, 
1976. (Pl.Ex.25) 
The Appellants visited the property on a number of occasions 
(R-106) prior to entering into a Lease Agreement and the property 
was also viewed and examined by the Appellants' son, a son-
in-law, and a key employee (R-107). 
The property leased had minimal parking adjacent to 
the property on the north and had a tract of property west 
of the building, which was vacant (R-108). 
A verbal agreement existed between the Respondents and 
-5-
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the property owner adjoining the Appellants' property to the 
north for use of such property for parking and an attempt to 
enter into a written agreement for an easement to rent or lease 
said property for the joint use of the Respondents and Tony 
Dekazos, who operated premises known as The Cedars Lounge, 
to the north and contiguous to the premises (R-215) was drafted, 
(Pl.Ex.l6), and the scrivenor's error occurred when the des-
cription of the Dekazos property was drafted as the property 
upon which the building and sign were located belonging to 
the Respondents. (R-110) 
A scrivenor's error does not per se invalidate a written 
agreement between the parties, where there is no mutual mistake 
of fact, and particularly where the Appellants herein were 
in peaceable possession of the premises and continued in such 
peaceable possession until the Appellants by their own volitional 
act abandoned the premises. 
The Utah Supreme Court has allowed the reformation of 
a deed based on oral conversations between the parties as set 
forth in Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, wherein the Court allowed 
evidence for reformation of a deed based upon such oral conversa-
tions and stated: 
The conversations between the attorney and the 
decedent show the attorney's authority and the 
purposes and limitation of such authority. The 
conversations between the attorney and Respondents 
-6-
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showed negotiations for and the consummation of a 
deal with Respondents in accordance with the 
attorney's authority. There was no assertion by 
any extra-judicial witness of a material fact for 
the purpose of proving the existence of such fact, 
but the fact that such conversations occurred werr 
circumstances would show the purpose and intentio 
of Decedent to convey to the Respondents uncondi-
tionally. The attorney was the one who acted fo 
the Decedent in the transactions involved herein 
and his evidence was competent to relate his 
version thereof and a relation of the conversa-
tions he had with the principals and the transaction 
was not hearsay, even though it necessarily included 
statements made by the other parties to the con-
versation which were not made in the presence of 
Appellant. 
In Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180, the Supreme Court of 
Utah held that lhe oversight on the part of the scrivenor in 
preparing a re: state purchase option agreement was the proper 
basis for refo• on of the document. 
In the c of In Re Harmon's Trust, 164 N.Y.S.2d 468, 
the Supreme Co\ of New York County held as follows: 
If, in fac , there was a scrivenor's error in 
transcribi~g settlor's intention at the time 
of creating the trust, it is correctible by the 
Court in an action to reform the instrument.*** 
In all the cases where reformation was granted 
by the Court, Petitioner presented direct and 
convincing evidence of the necessary facts of 
settlor's original intentions and instructions 
and of the mistake in the instrument as drawn. 
The original Covenant of Lease of the premises (Pl.Ex.l) 
contained an Option to Purchase in paragraph 26 thereof, setting 
forth an optional purchase price in the amount of $217,500.00 
(Pl.Ex.l), which property when sold by the Respondents following 
-7-
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the abandonment of said property by the Appellants was sold 
on September 10, 1976, to Robert H. Hinkley for the sum of 
$210,000.00 (Pl.Ex.l5). 
At the time of the abandonment of the premises by the 
Appellants, the option of purchase had expired, but the Appellants 
had made an offer to purchase the property on June 13, 1975, 
which communication contained no mention whatsoever or objection 
to any description of the property, alleging that the Appellants 
had had the buildings and properties appraised and were ready 
and willing to purchase same. (Pl.Ex.6) 
A follow-up letter was sent by the Appellants on July 25, 
1975, complaining of the Respondents' failure to reply to the 
offer made by the Appellants, again not bringing into notice 
or making any statements in regards to any defects of the descrip-
tion of the property or the right of possession thereof by 
the Appellants, but stating that unless the Respondents agreed 
to respond to the communication of June 13, 1975 (Pl.Ex.6), 
the Appellants would discontinue paying rent. (Pl.Ex.7) 
Respondent telephoned and spoke to the Appellant, Mr. Holt, 
and invited him to come and visit with the Respondent to discuss 
the matter. (R-113,-114) 
The Appellants did cease making payments upon the premises 
and the sign commencing July, 1975, as threatened by the Appellant: 
-8-
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in their communication of July 25, 1975. (Pl.Ex. 7) (R-115) 
The first claim made for Appellants as alleging improper 
description of one of the parcels of land as set forth in the 
Lease as a basis of the Appellants' failure to pay rent upon 
the premises and the sign was made for the first time by the 
Attorney for the Appellants on September 16, 1975, (R-119), 
with return of the keys not being made by the Attorney for 
the Appellants and actual notification of vacating of the premises 
until January 27, 1976. (Pl.Ex.25) (R-119) 
In Paulsen v. Coombs, 253 P.2d 621, the Utah Supreme 
Court rendered Judgment reforming a written contract which 
contained a provision inserted by inadvertence or mistake. 
The Court stated as follows: 
I am entirely in accord with the principle of 
preserving the sanctity of written contracts, 
but this applies only when the contract repre-
sents the intent of the parties. Where errors 
occur, clerical, typographical, or otherwise, 
of course, a contract can be reformed to show the 
true intent of the parties. In order to prove 
such mistake and avoid the effects of the written 
contract, the evidence must be clear and convincing; 
that is, it must be such that there is no serious 
nor substantial doubt what the true intent is. 
In the instant matter before the Court, there was no 
right or option to purchase the property at time of abandonment 
by Appellants, nor the necessity of reformation of the Lease 
Agreement, in that the Appellants were at no time interferred 
with in their possession of the premises and peaceably enjoyed 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
same until the Appellants, because of their own economic problems 
' 
as stated in the Appellants' communica.tion set forth in Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 6, abandoned and vacated the premises, and only after 
retaining counsel alleged as a defense to the abandonment of 
the premises an allegation of a wrongful description of the 
very building and premises upon which the Appellants did business 
for a period of more then two years. 
The error in itself made by Respondents' Attorney in 
using a d~scription intended to create an easement in adjoining 
property (Pl.Ex.l6) and by wrongfully inserting same in the 
Covenant of Lease as one of the descriptions of the property 
is alleged by Appellants to justify the invalidation of the 
total Lease Agreement as between the Respondents and Appellants. 
In Sheedy v. Stc!n, 101 N.Y.S.2d 773, the Supreme Court 
of Queens County hel~, that it was proper to reform a deed 
because of a scrivernor's error by the attorney who drew the 
deed. The Court observed as follows: 
Where a mistake is made by the scrivener in reducinr; 
an agreement to writing, such mistake may be corrected 
'no matter how it occurred'. 
In Delap v. Leonard, 178 N.Y.S. 102, the Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division of New York, held that it was proper to 
reform a deed containing an error made by the lawyer-scrivener 
and observed as follows: 
The Plaintiff should not be penalized because 
of this mistake. When there is no mistake 
-10-
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about Plaintiff's intention, but only in the 
writing, the mistake of the scrivenor, no matter 
how it occurred, ought to be corrected. 
And this is so, notwithstanding the long period 
of time that has elapsed between the time of the 
execution of the deed and the discovery of the 
mistake. 
In the case of Mills v. Schulba, 213 P.2d 408, the District 
Court of Appeals of California held that it was proper to reform 
a deed because of a mistake of the attorney employed by the 
parties to draw up the deed. The Court observed: 
Our courts have repeatedly held, that the mistake 
of a draftsman is a good ground for the reformation 
of an instrument which does not truly express the 
intention of the parties. 
In Sunnybrook Childrens' Home, Inc., v. Dahlem, 265 
So.2d 921, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held, that a scrivenor's 
error in a deed was a proper basis for its reformation. 
It would, therefore, appear that there is a unanimity 
of various jurisdictions and courts cited hereinabove, that 
a scrivenor's mistake is an obvious basis for reformation where 
necessary where the error thwarts the purposes and intention 
of the party executing the document, and it is evident that 
contracts and deeds have repeatedly been reformed when the 
evidence was clear and convincing that a scrivenor's error 
had taken place. 
The Respondents concede that if the Appellants had been 
ready and willing to exercise the previous expired option to 
-11-
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purchase the property, that the error in the description would 
not in any way have thwarted the Appellants in acquiring title 
to the property and, in fact, the Respondents were always ready 
and willing to allow the exercise of the option of purchase 
as evidenced from the entering into an Addendum to the Covenant 
of Lease extending the period for the exercise of the original 
option of purchase given by the Respondents to the Appellants 
(Pl.Ex.S), and by the expressed desire of the Respondents to 
discuss a sale of the property with the Appellants, which offer 
was made by the Respondents to the Appellants as late as June 
of 1975. (R-113,-114) 
The Appellant was directly asked whether or not the 
Respondent had ever misrepresented anything to Appellant to 
which Appellant answered that there never was any misrepresentation 
and that he had inspected the property and was aware of what 
property he was leasing and was aware of the parking arrangement 
with the neighbor. (R-59,-60) 
POINT II 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA\\' FOUIW BY TilE 
LOWER COURT IS BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
The Appellants in their argument to the Court as evi-
denced in Point I of Appellants' Brief seeks to establish the 
fact that the presentation of oral testimony in evidence of 
-12-
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scr~venor's error is inadmissible evidence, and the Respondents 
submit that Point I of Respondents' Brief responds to the allegations 
of the Appellants in regards to the legality of the admittance 
of such evidence. 
The Record before this Court as to the testimony and 
records as evidenced by the exhibits before the Court is supportive 
of the findings of the Lower Court, and this Court has stated 
in Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819 (1943), that Findings of 
Fact are defined as "ultimate facts" and that many facts which 
must be determined by deduction or inference from the basic 
facts require the application of a principle or proposition of 
law or an interpretation of contract or a statute in order 
to arrive at either the ultimate fact or some fact on the way, 
and that some factual deductions can be made from basic facts 
without the mental processes entertaining any legal propositions, 
and the Court further stated: 
We do not think that we should be technical in 
requiring a court to make refined separations between 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, especially 
where the basis for the so-called finding clearly 
appears in the Findings. 
The Court further stated that the Conclusions of Law 
are those conclusions which the Judge concludes flow from the 
ultimate facts as he finds them illuminated by subsidiary facts. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
are fully in accord with the Memorandum Decision of the Court, 
-13-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
A copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondents was posted 
in the u.s. mail postage prepaid and addressed to the Attorney 
for the Appellants, Kenneth L. Rothey, Esq., 2275 South vlest Temple, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, on this~ day of December, 1977. 
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